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1. Introduction 
The European Monetary Union was purposefully designed as a monetary union without a fiscal union. History 
has not been kind to such arrangements, as Bordo et al. (2011) argue and as several critics had warned 
before the eurozone came into being (for a review of that earlier literature, see Bornhorst, Mody, and 
Ohnsorge, forthcoming). The ongoing crisis appears to have validated these concerns. The absence of formal 
pooling of resources has required the construction of additional arrangements for inter-governmental fiscal 
support to respond to countries in crisis. These arrangements include the European Financial Stability Facility 
(EFSF) and the European Stability Mechanism (ESM). And as the crisis has evolved, the European Central 
Bank (the ECB) has needed to play an important role in supporting banks and, indirectly, sovereigns in need. 
In this context, the common issuance of debt in the euro area has been increasingly evoked— including most 
recently by the European Parliament and the European Council—both as an immediate response to the 
financial crisis and as a structural feature of the monetary union.  
This paper is a review of various proposals for common debt issuance. Clearly, common instruments are not 
the only or necessarily the primary way to reduce financial instability or improve economic, financial and 
fiscal governance in the euro area. Indeed, common debt issuance is inextricably linked to the shape and form 
of a future fiscal union. Because a fiscal (and banking) union is likely a longer-term project, a discussion of 
common instruments today can help sharpen the discussion of the choices underlying a fiscal union and 
possibly initiate more limited forms of risk-sharing and pooling that create a valuable learning process.   
In undertaking this review, we are motivated by the following questions: 
• How does the proposal change incentives of governments (debtors) and creditors? Does it offer 
clarity on how average and marginal costs of borrowing would be affected, and how default would be 
treated? 
• What is the nature of the insurance that is being offered? Would the new instrument help reduce risk 
and improve liquidity? Who will want to hold those instruments? 
• Would the (currently perverse) sovereign-bank linkages be reduced? What are effects on current 
financial markets (ill) functioning? 
• What are the phasing-in, transitional, legal, and institutional issues? 
• And, are there paths along which the different proposed instruments may be combined? 
 
In the next section, we provide a framework of objectives to guide the thinking about proposals. This is 
followed by sections that provide a summary and then a comparative analysis of five proposals: Bruegel’s 
Blue-Red bond; the Euro-nomics group ESBies; the German Economic Experts’ European Debt Redemption 
Fund; Thomas Philippon and Christian Hellwig’s Eurobills; and those options summarized in the EC Green 
Paper for discussion of November 2011.1
2. Objectives and Motivations 
 Next, we suggest two possible paths along which some of the 
proposals could be introduced. A final section offers some concluding reflections.  
The common issuance of debt could serve a number of different purposes. From the perspective of a 
sovereign debtor, common debt needs to provide incentives to prudence but also insurance against interest 
and liquidity shocks that can threaten debt sustainability. From the perspective of creditors, the construct 
needs to improve stability, liquidity and reduce the probability of default. The debate today, however, is not 
motivated mainly by such longer-term concerns of incentives and adequate fiscal risk-sharing mechanisms, 
but also by the urgency to stabilize financial markets, lower credit risk premiums, and eventually improve the 
outlook of debt dynamics of countries. 
Table 1 therefore suggests that the objectives fall into three broad categories: (i) fiscal risk-sharing and fiscal 
discipline; (ii) financial stability; and (iii) monetary policy transmission mechanism and financial markets’ 
functioning in the eurozone. There are evident overlaps as well as conflicts between these objectives. A test 
for the proposals is how they help—by themselves or in combination with other initiatives—in balancing 
these objectives.  
2.1 Fiscal risk-sharing and discipline 
In practice, fiscal unions have three facets: (a) frameworks for discipline (fiscal rules or other institutional 
tools), (b) risk-sharing mechanisms to help macroeconomic management (discretionary and automatic 
stabilizers) and (c) some degree of income equalization to correct more permanent differences in initial 
conditions or endowments. The distinction between risk-sharing against idiosyncratic economic shocks and 
income equalization features is intellectually clear but extremely challenging in practice. In fact, Sachs and 
Sala-i-Martin (1991) showed for the case of the US how apparently cyclical asymmetric shocks result in 
transfers of a quasi-permanent nature. Common debt issuance has risk-sharing features as it can provide 
some ex ante transfers through lower spreads for some sovereigns. And ex post transfers would occur where 
one of the member countries is not able to meet its obligations. 
                                                 
1 The idea of project bonds has been widely discussed and often tied to the debate on common d ebt issuance but we have decided not 
to include it in our overview for we do not consider it to be real mechanism of debt mutualization of a budgetary nature. In its scope 
and size, it is too limited to be a meaningful contributor to financial stability and fiscal risk-sharing. 
 Table 1: Objectives of Common Debt Issuance 
Fiscal risk-sharing and fiscal discipline  
Fiscal risk-sharing  
 
- monetary union requires some fiscal risk-sharing. This can be achieved 
through common debt in the form of ex-ante (borrowing cost and transfers) 
or ex-post (default) mechanisms 
- issuing debt jointly can reduce borrowing costs for currently stressed 
sovereigns, with gains at aggregate level 
Fiscal discipline 
 
- current methods of fiscal discipline have shown limits; common debt 
issuance with enhanced institutions and ex ante surveillance, and a better 
role for price signals could strengthen fiscal discipline 
Financial stability 
Bank-sovereign loop - home bias in sovereign debt holdings (that liquidity support measures (e.g., 
LTRO) may have increased) makes for perverse bank-sovereign links; 
common asset/pooling risks can reduce it 
Provision of a safe asset - when risk (perceptions) change, flight to quality leads to large, destabilizing 
changes in yields and capital movements; a large common safe asset can 
reduce these risks 
- with larger asset and better reserve currency, liquidity benefits can accrue 
to euro area and possibly help with global imbalances 
Monetary policy transmission and financial markets’ functioning 
Monetary transmission 
mechanism 
-monetary policy transmission mechanisms are impaired; a unified bill/bond 
market can help restore them 
Financial markets 
functioning 
- financial markets are increasingly fragmented along national lines; a 
reduction in country risks and common bill/bond markets can help revive the 
benefits of financial integration 
Yet, the possibility of transfers raises questions about moral hazard and the viability of any common debt 
proposal crucially depends on the ability to reduce and control it. The stronger the safety net and the larger 
the transfers, the greater is the concern that some countries may free ride. Common debt issuance thus 
requires powerful mechanisms to enforce fiscal discipline in a time-consistent manner. The design of the 
instruments can help provide price signals for the (marginal) borrowing cost to a sovereign but one also has 
to recognize that markets are prone to swings and excesses.2
                                                 
2 See Delors (1989): “experience suggests that market perceptions do not necessarily provide strong and compelling signals and that 
access to a large capital market may for some time even facilitate the financing of econ omic imbalances. Rather than leading to a 
gradual adaptation of b orrowing costs, market views about the creditworthiness of official borrowers tend to change abruptly and 
result in the closure of access to market financing. The constraints imposed by market forces might either be too slow and weak or too 
sudden and disruptive.” 
 Other mechanisms that rely on collegial rules 
and ex-post sanctions could be less effective, as experience with the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) shows. 
In this regard, the new institutional features of the European economic governance (Six Pack, Two Pack, and 
Fiscal compact) do enhance incentives for fiscal discipline. But the challenge is to complement fiscal rules 
affecting quantities most productively with market-based mechanisms using price signals. 
2.2 Financial Stability 
Common issuance of debt could make an important contribution to financial stability through two 
mechanisms. First, the links between banks and their respective national sovereign could be weakened. 
Banks (and other financial institutions) typically hold significant amounts of their respective government 
bonds as they are regarded as safe (and liquid) assets, or at least were so before the crisis. This “home bias” 
in sovereign bond holdings creates perverse feedback loops when concerns about sovereign risks translate 
into concerns about banks.3
In some countries, the weakness of the sovereign is currently also affecting banks’ ability to fund themselves 
and intermediate credit. In turn, this adversely affects the sovereign since the real economy is weakened and 
fiscal positions are undermined, and as the sovereign’s contingent liability vis-à-vis the banking system 
increases (Mody and Sandri, 2012). One objective of some proposals is thus to create a safe common asset, 
which is relatively insulated from an individual country’s banking sector and sovereign risks.  
 And banks rely on a public safety net which is nationally funded, either explicitly 
(as in deposit insurance) or implicitly (in the form of guarantees and recapitalizations). In the absence of a 
common safety net (e.g., common deposit insurance, funding for recapitalization, all accompanied by 
common regulations and supervision, and centralized resolution authority), concerns about banks’ risks 
translate into concerns about the sovereign. 
The second financial stability mechanism could work by increasing the supply of safe assets. This could 
reduce the risk of a flight to quality (or safety), where small shocks, including changes in ratings, drive large 
wedges in yields between (perceived to be) risky and safe sovereigns, and lead to large cross-border capital 
flows. As investors migrate funds to (perceived) safer jurisdiction and/or assets, these flights to safety 
create funding challenges for banks and other financial institutions. With debts pooled in sufficient amounts 
or made different than the debts of the national sovereigns, these risks can be reduced. A large safe asset can 
also reduce the need for extraordinary liquidity provision from the ECB. 
Common euro debt arguably provides other benefits. These could come in the form of a liquidity premium 
from a large safe asset, help manage international investment positions, and gain more of the advantages of 
a reserve currency, now largely captured by the U.S. dollar. Over time, a greater supply of safe assets from 
Europe could then contribute to stabilize the international monetary system, and perhaps help reduce global 
                                                 
3 As Angeloni and Wolff (2012) and others have shown, there is a high correlation between the nationality of the banks (and its 
location) and the nationality of the government claims it holds. And this correlation has increased since the crisis began, possibly in 
part due to ECB liquidity support measures, such as the Long-Term Refinancing Operations (LTRO). 
imbalances (see Angeloni et al, 2011). As such, a pooling or common issuance of sovereign debt can help 
improve financial stability at the European and global level. 
2.3 Monetary policy transmission and financial markets functioning 
The normal monetary policy transmission channels in the euro zone are currently disrupted since there are 
large market segmentations and fragmentations along national lines across the credit spectrum. Depending 
on where they are located, borrowers face different interest rates and even credit rationing. This means that 
interest rate policy set centrally by the ECB does not translate adequately into (changes in) local lending and 
funding conditions. These differences are in large part due to concerns about the health of national banking 
systems, in turn related to the health of the sovereign. The ECB has embarked on a wide range of non-
conventional policies over the last few years to restore the proper functioning of financial markets so as to 
allow for a proper transmission of monetary policy. But these actions have, however, for the most part, only 
minimized the most adverse consequences of shocks and averted liquidity crises and systemic banking 
failures, but not brought financial conditions back to normal.   
Commonly issued debt could contribute to restoring financial markets’ functioning and monetary policy 
transmission by providing for a unified and deep market for euro sovereign securities. In addition, having one 
such asset could allow the ECB to embark on quantitative easing, if and when needed, without concerns for 
the distributional effects or consequences for its balance sheet.  
3. Summary of the proposals reviewed 
The discussion of common euro debt started soon after the introduction of the euro, when in 2000 the 
Giovannini Group (2000) recommended increased coordination of public debt issuance with a final objective 
of joint issuance. This call was echoed by the European Primary Dealers Association (2008, 2009) and often 
discussed among national debt management offices. Common euro debt was thought to offer an alternative 
safe-haven to US Treasuries and reinforce the role of the euro as a reserve currency. Proposals consequently 
stressed that common debt would help reap a liquidity premia, possibly leading to lower borrowing costs for 
all issuers. 
With the crisis, common debt became quickly seen as a possible crisis resolution tool. As early as May 2009, 
De Grauwe and Moesen (2009) suggested common debt to avoid diverging borrowing costs, with adverse 
consequences for debt sustainability and risks of propagation. Gros and Micossi (2009) followed with a 
proposal to leverage borrowing for joint European fiscal stimulus. Both proposals got limited traction but 
probably inspired the design of the EFSF launched in May 2010. As the crisis deepened and measures put in 
place showed limits, new proposals have emerged. These stressed how common debt could help with both 
short-term challenges related to the crisis and more medium-term objectives related to the architecture of 
the monetary union. Of these, we include, and review in the next section, the following most important five 
(see Appendix I for more details; Bijlsma and Vallée, 2012, provide a discussion of related euro area safety 
nets).4
In May 2010, Delpla and Von Weizsäcker issued their “Blue-Red bond” proposal, which has subsequently been 
augmented. It involves the mutualization of the debt of each member state equal to 60% of GDP—called Blue 
bonds—with the remainder—Red bonds—still to be issued on a national basis. This split and the joint and 
several guarantees are designed to insulate banks from national sovereign risks, lower borrowing costs for 
some sovereigns, and reduce flight to safety. Any residual borrowing (i.e., above the 60% of GDP threshold) 
would be through the Red bond, which is explicitly junior and hence at a (marginal) cost reflecting the 
country’s own creditworthiness, thus maintaining price signals and fiscal discipline incentives. Since then, 
the proposal has been amended to clarify that the transition would be gradual, with guarantees and common 
bond financing phased in over a period of 3-4 years. 
 
Starting October 2011, the euro-nomics group—an informal group of economists—has suggested using 
financial engineering to create a form of common safe debt by pooling and tranching a balanced portfolio of 
eurozone sovereign debts. The so-called European Safe Bond (ESBies) would be the senior tranche and EJB 
the junior tranche of this structure. It would serve two purposes: first, banks holding ESBies would no longer 
be exposed to national sovereign risks, but to combined eurozone risk; and second, any flight to safety would 
be from the EJBs, the junior (risky) bond, to the ESBies and not, as now, from one country to another, thus 
reducing a source of multiple equilibriums and instability. Because the core of the proposal requires no 
sovereign guarantees, it faces limited hurdles to implementation, yet it can also be easily reversed. 
In November 2011, the German Council of Economic Experts proposed an alternative, in many ways the 
converse of the Blue-Red proposal. The so called Redemption Pact would transfer the debt of a member state 
in excess of 60% of GDP (if any) into a European Debt Redemption Fund (ERF) for which all members would be 
jointly and severally liable. The total debt covered would amount to some 27% of eurozone GDP, with Germany, 
Italy, and Spain the largest participants. In return, countries would agree to repay ERF the transferred debts 
within some 25 years, with these obligations senior to remaining national debts and possibly backed up by 
collateral and dedicated tax revenues from each country. During a roll-in phase of 3 to 4 years, participating 
countries would, by transferring obligations coming due up to their issued quota of guaranteed debt, be able 
                                                 
4 A number of other proposals exist. In 2010, the EC proposed “project bonds,” essentially joint and several bonds, to finance pan 
European projects and leverage the borrowing capacity of the EU budget. Political agreement now exists to introduce these b onds on a 
pilot basis summer 2012. As the EC itself accepts, however, project bonds are very different from common debt and can neither 
address current financial instability or the more fundamental deficiencies of the m onetary union. Fonseca and Santa Clara (2012) 
propose that the discount Germany obtains because of the flight to safety be redistributed to countries that borrow today at higher 
interest rates. Such lump-sum transfers would not involve guarantees whatsoever, leaving defaults and restructuring still possible, 
but would offset the higher costs paid by weaker debtors. Somewhat similar, Cline (2012) proposes a mechanism where countries 
would contribute to a fund that effectively insures against market credit risk with strong countries providing backing. Erber (2012) 
suggests to reduce moral hazard risks through “conditional eurobonds” where only a small group of AAA-rated countries would have 
access to common debt.  
to meet much of financing requirements. Any other debt would remain of national responsibility and be junior. 
The authors suggest that the design overcomes European legal barriers to implementation.  
Also in November 2011, Hellwig and Philippon proposed a variant to the Blue-Red proposal limited to short-
term common debt (i.e., Eurobills), envisioned to be about 10% of GDP. The proposal pools all short-term 
borrowings, backed up by joint and several guarantees, and thus allows (some) member states to borrow 
some amounts at lower interest rates—thereby improving their debt sustainability dynamics, while at the 
same time providing a safe asset to banks—thereby reducing financial stress. The short maturity has the 
benefit of imposing some continuous discipline (as guarantees need not be renewed). And while the proposal 
is easily scalable to longer-term claims, it also has a built-in exit mechanism (as claims with guarantees can 
be rolled off). Because of its more limited nature, the proposal is thought to more easily comply with 
European and national legal constraints. 
The EC issued a Green paper on November 23, 2011 on the feasibility of introducing so-called stability bonds. 
The three options listed largely built on existing proposals and range from complete substitution of national 
debt by common bonds issued under a joint and several framework, to issuance of both common and national 
debts, and to a more modest option of bonds with just several guarantees. Depending on the option chosen, 
changes to institutions, including EU-Treaties and financial markets, would be needed to minimize risks, 
especially moral hazard, ensure budgetary discipline, and keep costs low.  
4. Assessment of the proposals 
Based on the objectives laid out in section 2, we analyze the proposals from the perspective of debtors, 
creditors, and the transitional needs of the proposals.5
4.1 Countries’ Incentives 
  The comparison of the proposals along these 
dimensions sets up the discussion on possible paths in section 5. 
The various schemes can alter country’s incentives in two ways: first, individual countries can benefit from 
issuing debt that is, at least in part, underwritten by other, stronger countries, which in turn raises issues of 
fiscal discipline and moral hazard; and, second, debt seniority structures are altered, creating differences 
between marginal and average cost of borrowings, with associated differences in restructuring probabilities. 
Table 2 summarizes and offers a guide to the discussion below along these dimensions.  
Use of guarantees. A crucial economic dimension from the borrower’s incentive point of view is whether the 
proposal relies on intergovernmental guarantees and the scope of such guarantees. This determines in large 
part whether the scheme reduces the borrowing costs for a specific country, and thus determines the 
                                                 
5 For other evaluations, see Association of Financial Markets (2012), Carstensen (2011), Favero and Missale (2010, 2012), European 
League for Econ omic Co-operation (2011), and Tirole (2012). 
distributional effects across countries (ex-ante or ex-post). It also determines the risk of moral hazard and 
thus whether (stronger) forms of fiscal and market discipline are needed. One model is that of “joint and 
several” intergovernmental guarantees, where sovereigns that participate in the scheme are all individually 
responsible for full repayment, even when one or more sovereigns cannot repay. Depending also on amounts 
covered, this creates relatively open-ended commitments and risks for the sovereigns involved. Another 
model is that of “several” guarantees, where one or more sovereigns guarantee a certain part or amount of 
another sovereign claims, but where the total liability of each sovereign is limited. For example, the current 
EFSF bonds are guaranteed by various governments up to specific amounts (or shares) and the guarantees 
are therefore simply “several” but not “joint”. Regardless, the legal mechanisms used to enforce guarantees in 
each of the national states would have to be closely scrutinized. 
Table 2: Country Incentives 
 Euro-bills  Blue-Red Bonds  Stability Bonds  Redemption Pact ESBies 
Guarantees  JS Blue: JS 
 Red: No 
JS + S JS No 
Amounts of 
guarantees on 
issuance 
≈10% of GDP  Up to 60% of GDP No Over 60% of GDP 
(about 27% of €-
GDP) 
Up to 60% of GDP 
Tranching and 
pooling 
No tranching.  
Pooling 
Tranching and pooling Dependi ng on 
option 
Tranching and 
some pooling 
Pooling 
Rule based fiscal  
discipline  
Yes, through 
limitation of quota 
“SGP 2.0,” FC, 2P, 6P, debt brakes, some enforcement thr ough 
earmarking and collateral  
Not needed 
Market based 
fiscal discipline 
Price signals on 
rest of debt 
Price signals on red 
debt 
No explicit, but 
depends on option 
Price signals on 
other debt 
Not sought or  
needed 
Fiscal 
coordination  
Not necessarily Committee, allocates 
Blue bonds, some 
common taxes  
Depends. Some 
coordination, some 
fiscal union 
Much coordination, 
some fiscal union 
Not necessary 
Restructuring Not envisioned Red bonds yes, link to 
ESM;  
Blue bonds not 
Not discussed. 
CACs similar to 
current  
Not envisioned. 
CACs similar to 
current  
At countr y level, 
EJBs to absorb 
loss, link to ESM 
Notes: JS stands for Joint and Several; S stands for Several; “SGP 2.0” stands for an enhanced Stability and Growth Pact; FC stands for Fiscal 
Compact; 2P stands for Two Pack; 6P stands for Six Pack; the fiscal rules are to some degree complementary and overlapping; ;CAC stands for 
Collective Action Clause. 
The Eurobills, Blue-bonds, and Redemption bonds involve joint and several guarantees; the EC Green Paper 
has two options with joint and several and one with several; and the ESBies do not require any 
intergovernmental guarantees (but some credit enhancements with paid in capital could be used). In terms 
of amounts, the Eurobills’ guarantees are limited, up to about 10% of GDP;6 the Blue-bonds and Redemption 
bonds relatively large, respectively up to 60% of GDP or all debts over 60% of GDP (some 2.3 trillion euro or 27% 
of euro area GDP);7
Use of tranching. Most of the proposals use some form of tranching or seniority structure (the Eurobills 
proposal relies largely on the de-facto seniority derived from its short maturity).
 and the EU Green Paper amounts vary, depending on the option. These differences mean 
that the Blue-Red proposal has likely the most impact on the cost of borrowing, followed by the Redemption 
Pact, and then the Eurobills. 
8 Tranching enhances the 
safety of the senior instruments and makes the junior tranche more sensitive, which could allow markets to 
play a greater disciplining role (e.g., for a country with more than 60% of debt to GDP that issues, the Red 
bonds’ prices would be more sensitive to its fiscal conditions). Whether a “Modigliani-Miller proposition” holds, 
i.e., whether the sum of the value (or risk) of the original instrument is the same as the combined values (or 
risks) of the tranched instruments, is unclear. Having junior claims could add value if fiscal discipline is 
improved, but there could also some risks.9
Need for enhanced fiscal and market discipline. The use and amount of guarantees and the relative 
(in)effectiveness of market discipline dictate the need for (more) ex-ante fiscal discipline and other moral 
hazard mitigating measures. All proposals, other than ESBies, call for strengthened fiscal surveillance and 
most call for more fiscal coordination. The tools proposed to achieve fiscal discipline are largely similar across 
proposals: essentially combinations of an enhanced Stability and Growth Pact, debt brakes (such as those 
used in Germany and Switzerland), the new Fiscal Compact, Six Pack and Two Pack.
 Analytics and empirics on this are limited, especially for 
sovereigns, and effects will in part depend on what classes of investors hold which claim, and on how the 
phase-in and transition are structured. 
10 The Redemption Pact 
also proposes to use collateral in the form of gold reserves of the national central bank and earmarking of 
fiscal revenues to ensure repayment.11
                                                 
6 There is some allowance for continued national issuance of short-term debt for cash management purposes, but to avoid adverse 
selection—stronger countries issuing largely on their own—this would have to be limited. 
 The fact that (most) proposals recognize the need for safeguards 
7 In principle, the cut-off for the Blue-Red proposal could be less (or more) than 60% depending on countries’ debt capacity, but this 
may be difficult to determine and to apply. A recent variant of the Redemption plan would set the 60% floor on a prospective basis, i.e., 
instead of a current cutoff, countries’ expected debt as of say three years from now above 60% would be mutualized. This would mean 
that countries with large expected fiscal deficits, but low current debt, like Spain, would have a larger amount of debt mutualized, 
which would help with near-term financing requirements. 
8 There are many questions on the ranking and seniority treatment of common debt. Would this seniority (vis-à-vis national debt or 
other (common) debt) just be based on the joint guarantees of other national states or on other legal mechanisms? Would an 
instrument like the Eurobills purely rely on its short-term maturity to obtain or also on legal mechanisms to support its seniority? 
Related, what is the legal treatment of issuing entities (e.g., European Debt Agency), which may in turn become bondholder or creditor 
(e.g., of national debt)? 
9 For example, (exogen ous) shocks could get more easily reflected and amplified in the pricing of the junior tranche (e.g., as roll-over 
risk increases, leading to Calvo (1988) style liquidity problems), which could worsen borrowing conditions, increase bank-sovereign 
links (if junior tranches are (allowed to be) held by banks), and as a result lead to a “loss in value” and a worse overall outcome. 
10 These and other fiscal rules are to some degree complementary and overlapping (e.g.,, the FC includes the SGP Pact and debt 
brakes, while the SGP is an element of the Six Pack. And, as with all rules, there are general time-consistency questions, e.g., will they 
be enforced if a (large) country finds it in its interest to deviate? 
11 Obviously, the exact legal forms of guarantees, how they will be provided (e.g., at a single point time, irrevocable, or annually, with 
some conditions) and the treatments of collateral will greatly matter for enforcem ent of any guarantee and mobilization of collateral. 
does not mean, however, that all issues are clear.12
Some proposals also add a pricing element to fiscal discipline. Thus, the higher price paid for the Red bond in 
the Blue-Red proposal potentially creates an incentive to limit debt issuance. The Eurobills proposal also 
relies on the possibility of being excluded from the ability to roll-over the short-term claim. The Redemption 
Pact has no added pricing incentives to behave and requires very specific and strict fiscal targets, as 
participating countries are required to meet the debt target of 60% of GDP at the end of the 25-year period, 
which implies for some countries significant primary surpluses (and which earmarking can make more 
binding). Whether fiscal coordination—in the setting of annual budgets, annual allocation of (new) 
borrowings or otherwise—is needed depends also on the use of guarantees. 
  
Restructuring. An important incentive issue is whether the (new) instruments can be restructured, and if so 
how. Having seniority and tranching structures implicitly assumes the possibility of (differential) 
restructuring, but most proposals do not explicitly discuss this, in part as they assume that the new 
framework makes (senior) debt restructuring less likely. This may not be credible and to be operational, 
further changes would be needed. In particular, each proposal would need to consider how the possibility of 
restructuring affects the borrowers’ incentives and the creditors’ willingness to hold various claims. These 
restructuring modalities depend in part on the law(s) the instruments will be based on.13
4.2 Creditors 
 Ease of 
restructuring also depends on whether the instruments have embedded Collective Action Clauses (CACs)—
while all euro area sovereign debt issues are expected to have CACs by 2013, it isn’t clear whether the new, 
more senior instruments will also have them. There is also the question of how various instruments relate to 
the ESM. Obviously, the junior claims are assumed to be restructured first (the Blue-Red proposal has specific 
references to IMF programs and ESM actions that could trigger a Red bond restructuring; and the ESBies 
proposal sees a role for the ESM in the EJBs).  
The various schemes affect creditors in a number of ways: by creating a new, safe(r) more liquid asset; and 
by affecting the (relative) demand for various sovereign claims. These in turn will affect the interest rates 
                                                                                                                                                       
For instance, budgetary law may appropriate sums/revenues for destination exclusively to common debt or may more generally 
identify certain sources of budgetary revenues, with the two models having significant differences. While some proposals suggest a 
specific tax levied on real estate to service common bonds in case of default, most proposals do not specify this. 
12 Safeguards could involve (annual or gen eral) limits on common  debt issuance, limits on fiscal deficits and ceilings on debt 
accumulation, and other specific (fiscal) incentives (such as penalties). These are not the only or necessary most important possible 
disciplining features. The Blue-Red bonds proposal envisions that the annual allocation of Blue bonds b e proposed by an independent 
stability council staffed by independent professionals (similar to the Executive Board of the ECB). Other safeguards are possible as 
well.  
13 Currently, sovereign claims of EU-countries are based on local as well as foreign laws, with the UK law the most often used foreign 
law. There are large differences among these legal regimes though, including on the ability to restructure bonds (e.g., under UK law 
restructuring is more difficult), and the corresponding de-facto seniority status of the bonds. A related question is whether a 
“Eurobond governing law” is needed, so as to have a uniform regime, but so far non e of the proposals spell this and other related legal 
aspects out. 
expected on the new instruments, and the (relative) pricing of current and new instruments. Table 3 
summarizes proposals along some dimensions here.14
Safe and liquid asset. The most important creditor dimension is the degree to which a safe asset is created, 
that has a large stock or volume available, is relatively liquid, and appeals to a large (and possibly additional) 
investor base. Such an asset could command a liquidity premium, and thereby lower the cost of capital for all, 
and avoid flights to safety. Guarantees, tranching and pooling are the most important means by which safety 
is achieved, with diversification the most important for the ESBies.
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Table 3: Creditors 
 
Notes: MTM stands for mark to market 
The ESBies would have a big and most immediate effect, since they are intended to operate on the existing 
pool of assets available in the secondary markets and the operation could be large (euro 5.5 trillion). The 
proposal also has a conservative tranching structure. The Blue-Red bonds have the most to offer in that all 
countries’ debt up to the threshold of 60% is included, pooling many safe claims. It also limits the coexistence 
of common securities with large amounts of highly-rated national debt (where the latter can remain a 
destination for flights to safety). The Redemption Pact—with its relatively large size and joint and several 
                                                 
14 There are many other monetary policy and financial market questions. Annex 1 summarizes the proposals along some of these 
other dimensions. 
15 There are obvious limits to diversification to lower overall risk given the high correlations among spreads of different sovereigns in 
the euro area, especially in times of stress, driven in large part by the endogeneity of risks (e.g., the probability of default by a 
sovereign conditional on another sovereign defaulting is higher than the unconditional probability). Wagner (2011) actually argues 
that pooling can increase joint failure risk, worse than a single country default. Nevertheless, and albeit most often not quantified, 
some diversification gains should still exist in principle as countries face different exposures to r eal and financial shocks.  
  Euro-bills Blue-Red Bonds  Stability Bonds Redemption Pact ESBies 
Safe and liquid 
asset 
Yes, but small Yes, and large Depending on 
option  
Yes, but smaller 
and temporary  
Yes, and 
relatively large 
Main source of 
safety  
Maturity and 
guarantees 
Guarantees, 
tranching and 
pooling 
Depending on 
option 
Guarantees, 
tranching and 
some pooling 
Pooling 
Investors’ base Commercial banks  Various, but red not 
by banks  
Various Various Various, but EBJs 
not by banks 
Regulatory 
requirements 
Incentives, regs to 
hold as safe 
assets, e.g., Basel 
III liquidity rules 
Incentive to hold as safe assets, e.g., capital adequacy, 
solvency, liquidity, accounting (no MTM) like other sovereign 
claims. Some restrictions (e.g., Red not to be held by banks) 
Regulations TBD. 
EJBs more 
complex 
Price effects Liquidity premium. 
Limited/none on 
secondary prices  
Liquidity and flight to safety premiums. 
New seniority classes could mean large secondary prices 
changes if phased in fast and an issue at transition points 
Some premium. 
Maintains price 
signals across 
yield curves 
guarantees, has also much to offer in terms of creating a safe asset, albeit temporary.16
Who will hold the new asset? The demand for the various instruments relates importantly to the sovereign-
bank link. Without breaking this link, demand will remain fragmented and a liquidity premium is unlikely to 
materialize. And breaking this link is important in its own right (although there may be other ways to achieve 
it). The ability to reduce this link largely varies with the guarantees and amounts envisioned, and phase-in. In 
steady state, Blue bonds and ESBies have much to offer here—as they are large (note that Red bonds are not 
assumed to be held by banks), followed by Redemption bonds (initially relatively large, but declining as 
countries repay and more composed of claims on high-debt countries), and Eurobills (given its smaller size), 
with the EC options in between depending on which is chosen.  
 The Eurobills being 
smaller in size and the EC options, depending on which is chosen, would have more intermediary effects. 
Regardless, the degree to which liquidity, pooling and other gains will be feasible will depend on detailed 
designs and other aspects. As noted by, among others, Tirole (2012), a common security might still require a 
“lender-of-last-resort,” in the form of the central bank being willing to buy the securities, to allow for a 
premium.  
The investor bases for the various claims will otherwise vary, depending in part on regulations, notably bank 
liquidity and capital adequacy requirements. For some, such as the Eurobills, demand is more obvious 
(mainly Eurozone commercial banks, especially when they are required to maintain certain liquidity ratios).17
Effects on costs. Predicting the attractiveness of claims and final effects on liquidity and pricing is difficult as 
it depends on various parameters, many often left open in proposals. Even making further assumptions, 
though, it is not immediately clear what the effects might be. For example, much will depend on the final 
rating that agencies will assign to the new instrument. This is not obvious, even in light of how agencies rated 
earlier bonds of EFSF, EIB and the like (where rating agencies applied conservative criteria).
 
For others, such as the EBJs, the investor base is less obvious (except banks should not be allowed to hold 
them). In terms of (expected) treatment for capital adequacy purposes, the current, Basel II (and EU CRD3) 
risk weights are quite favorable to sovereign debt (issued within Europe), but may be revised upwards. 
Instruments such as Blue bonds may then appeal to banks when treated favorably. Requiring higher risk 
weights for some instruments (e.g., Red bonds and EJBs) will also help reinforce that these are junior claims. 
Rules for insurance companies (e.g., Solvency II) and pension funds will also matter since these institutions 
invest significantly in sovereign debt. 
18
                                                 
16 The temporary nature of the Redemption bond could negatively affect its liquidity (premium). Another drawback of the Redemption 
proposal is its limited ability to rely on diversification as a source of safety, since most of the debt pooled would be from high-debt 
countries, and coexistence of highly-rated national debts. 
 Other factors 
17 Various liquidity ratios associated with Basel III could increase demand for highly liquid assets by up to 1.2 trillion euro for EU banks 
(EBA, 2012). This could greatly favor Eurobills if they are deemed (solely) eligible. 
18 Some rating agencies have said that if the instrument has a several guarantee, then it would be rated according to the weakest-link 
approach, as it is called, where it get the lowest country rating, e.g., see Standard and Poor’s (2011) and 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/03/us-europe-sp-idUSTRE7820RN20110903. 
such as liquidity premium are also hard to estimate. Nevertheless, analyses to date suggest a liquidity 
premium for a market of the size of the euro area ranging between 15bps and 70bps.19
4.3 Coverage and Phase-in 
 Note that the ESBies, 
while it also offers liquidity and flight to safety premiums, otherwise maintain the price signals for each 
individual sovereign across the whole yield spectrum. 
Most of the analysis so far has focused on the medium term, steady state situation. It is important though to 
assess the initial coverage of countries, how different proposals can be phased in, the transition back to 
national issuances, and necessary lead-time. Table 4 summarizes proposals along some dimensions relevant 
here.  
Table 4: Coverage, phase-in and transition 
 
Countries included. The first question, very important in the short-term, is the country grouping envisioned. 
No proposal assesses this from first principles.20
                                                 
19 European Commission Green paper (2011) estimates. See Warnock and Warnock (2006) for a methodology applied to the US 
Treasury market and replicable in principle for the euro area. 
 Rather, most start from the entire euro area, even though 
one could start with a smaller core set that expands over time. Most exclude program countries, largely as 
these have much of their external financing covered and/or present too large risks. In principle though, 
program countries could be included under some proposals (say for the Eurobills, since they have continued 
20 This would require answering questions similar to those for optimal currency areas and fiscal unions, the accompanying democratic 
system for federal economic governance, as well as what other elements need to be in place (e.g., common financial regulation and 
supervision, for the euro area, the relevant smaller grouping, or the whole of the EU; some degree of fiscal union in the form of having 
common revenue bases, etc.) 
 Euro-bills Blue-Red Bonds Stability Bonds Redemption Pact ESBies 
Countries and 
amounts 
Could phase in, but 
need core. During 
ramp-up more 
Core could be small. 
Amounts can adjust, 
up to 60% 
Could phase in, but 
need core 
All countries over 
60%. Phase in 3-5 
years 
Initial could be 
(dis)-
proportional, but 
need core 
Program 
countries  
Not. Once regain 
market access 
Only after 
restructuring. All pre-
restructuring debt 
junior 
Not Could, but only 
after program ends 
Not 
New issues or 
all debt 
New issues, up to a 
cap 
New issues, up to 
60% 
New issues New issues during 
phase in, up to 
quota 
All debt in 
secondary 
market 
Exit 
possibilities 
Could pay off, issue 
own, rules to limit 
though 
Opt out (revert to 
red) 
No, but access can 
be limited 
Automatic at 60%. 
Forfeit collateral 
when default 
Reversal possible 
Lead time Moderate, start small Considerable Moderate to 
considerable 
Moderate to 
considerable 
Minimally 
to issue their own short-term instruments). Some, like the Blue-Red bonds, allow for full entry of program 
countries post debt restructuring, but with all pre-restructuring debt made junior to new debt.  
Coverage of instruments. All proposals with guarantees focus on new issuances, consistent with their use of 
seniority and tranching structures: newly issued debt becomes common and senior, while existing, national 
debt becomes junior. There are differences though in amounts (e.g., all debts below a certain cutoff as a 
percent of GDP (Blue-Red) or above a certain cutoff as a percent of GDP (Redemption), type of instruments 
covered (only short (Eurobills) versus only longer maturities, all others), and time horizon (temporary in case 
of Redemption, permanent in principle for all others). The focus on primary markets, i.e., new issues, 
presumably reflects that this will generate the largest impact for a given amount of intergovernment 
guarantees, and help the most with the short-term financing needs of those sovereigns under stress. The one 
without guarantees (ESBies) covers most old and new debt. 
Phase-in. Most proposals (except for the Eurobills and ESBies) suggest a phase in over 3-5 years. During this 
period some of external financing of countries would come from the new instruments, with the portion the 
highest for the Blue-Red, then the Redemption for high-debt countries, followed by the Eurobills, and 
dependent on the specific option, the EC. This will obviously help those countries currently under stress as 
their external financing will be (largely) covered at lower costs (but with costs to rise of course for the other 
countries). A phase-in also avoids a large immediate effect on secondary market prices and allows for some 
learning by doing (and potential reversals). At the same time, reducing the perverse sovereign-bank link and 
limiting flights-to-quality call for faster and larger-scale adoptions.21
Transition. Once a country has exhausted its allotment of new bonds, it will have to transition back to national 
debt issuance. For the transition to a structure with different forms of debt and seniority classes to be 
smooth at the end of the phase-in debt sustainability and fiscal discipline need to be assured. This is needed 
since at the same time some debt has become senior or (more) fiscal resources are earmarked, and it will 
thus be harder for the sovereign to raise new funds at the margin. Issuing Red bonds, for example, can be 
challenging for a country when a large portion of its debt (60%) will then be senior. And while the Redemption 
Pact generally makes a smaller portion of debt senior, it does so for higher-indebted countries. In these cases, 
the ability to issue national debt on their own terms after the phase-in period might just very soon raise again 
for some countries the questions of debt sustainability and mechanisms required to address the flow of 
financing.
  
22
                                                 
21 Some instruments can be introduced faster. For example, a common instrument, e.g., Blue-Red bonds, could be part of a large-scale 
debt restructuring for over-indebted countries (e.g., a kind of Brady bond deal). Clearly, this would require that post restructuring the 
country’s debt sustainability is assured. And it would have major current implications for banks holding much of affected sovereign 
claims (e.g., it could imply a common recapitalization scheme). Regardless, fast introduction could require deep and rapid 
institutional changes. 
 Failing that, an efficient sovereign debt restructuring mechanism would need to be in place.  
22 Take a high-debt country that only issues guaranteed debt until it reaches its sum allotted (the difference bet ween its current debt 
and the 60% of GDP threshold). Depending on the profile of maturing existing debt and fiscal deficits, this could occur over 3-4 years. 
Lead-time. To help address the current crisis, a short lead-time to set up the institutional infrastructure is 
important. The ESbies proposal, as it relies on the pooling of sovereign claims in the secondary market and 
the tranching of risks with existing instruments, can probably be set up the quickest, followed by the 
Eurobills, largely because of its smaller size and simple structure. Both also allow for the easiest learning by 
doing—as they combine a short phase in—allow for possible expansion, and yet can be easily exited. The 
other options would take more time, both in negotiating the terms and setting up the institutions.  
Exit. Exit involves two aspects: whether and how countries can be forced to exit; and whether countries are 
able to exit on their own choosing. For the Redemption Pact, exit follows automatically when the country falls 
below the 60% of debt to GDP ratio (or at the end of the 25 year redemption period). Besides paying a penalty 
(which may or may not be credible), however, there is no interim exit mechanism envisioned after launch. 
This is in part purposeful, so as to enforce the adjustment path decided at inception. But it ignores the 
occurrence of shocks that might make the path untenable. The ESBies can technically be reversed quickly. 
The Blue-Red proposal allows for exit through (majority) voting. Eurobills exit is feasible if a country pays off 
its claims or lets them mature. For both, countries can decide not to renew their guarantees (although it is 
unclear whether this is credible in the face of acute financial distress). In principle “orderly” exit, as a choice 
of the country, is feasible if it prepays its share of common claims but this is not realistic for the worse 
countries. In addition, in order to avoid adverse effects and dynamics—better countries exiting and thereby 
worsening the residual pool, exit should be made difficult and costly. At the same time, the possibility of exit 
can give incentives to those designated to do surveillance—e.g., fiscal council, EC—to perform their 
monitoring role properly and enforce rules.  
4.4 Legal and institutional challenges 
Many legal and institutional issues arise with the common issuance of euro debt, in particular to two 
dimensions: those pertaining to European laws and treaties; and those pertaining to the laws and 
constitutions of member states. There are also questions on the governance and the accountability 
framework for debt issuance from both EU and national/constitutional perspectives. The proposals do not 
claim to have the full assessment as to these questions (and we surely do not have the expertise to issue a 
definitive judgment), and more work is needed on the legal feasibility of each proposal and necessary 
institutional changes. 
                                                                                                                                                       
After that it would have to issue entirely on its own, yet its debt level could still be high, say above 100% of GDP, while the newly issued 
national debt would be of lower seniority status with no guarantees and some tax revenues would be dedicated to service the 
common securities.  
EU Treaty. The main EU legal question is whether the introduction of jointly and severally guaranteed debt 
contravenes provisions of the European Treaty, in particular Article 125.23 This article, colloquially known as 
the “no bail out” clause, effectively prohibits a member state from assuming the debt of another member 
state. Legal scholars used to diverge on the interpretation of this article, but bilateral assistance to Greece 
and the creation of the EFSF have led to some clarification. Some scholars, and the legal services of the 
Council, now seem to interpret the Article as compatible with joint and several guarantees as long as member 
states enter voluntarily into such agreements.24
National legal questions. Each member state is likely to have important and idiosyncratic legal challenges 
and the possibility that constitutional amendments are necessary in a number of countries is more than 
distinct. This is particularly, but not only, the case for Germany, key to any decision on common debt 
issuance. For Germany, and likely for other countries, the issue is whether the proposals comply with the 
provision of its constitution with respect to prerogatives of parliament and budgetary processes. Two 
important rulings by the Karlsruhe Constitutional Court helped to frame the court’s interpretation of these 
issues: one on the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 (Schorkopf, 2009) and one on the EFSF in 2011 (Mayer, 2012). 
Both rulings limit the scope for intergovernmental guarantees to specific designs and limited amounts.
 Some proposals (Blue-Red Bonds, two of the EC options) 
nevertheless clearly state that their proposal would require a change in the Treaty. In contrast, the ESBies 
proposal states clearly that it expects it would not; and the Eurobills proposal is more ambivalent about 
whether change may be mandatory. The Redemption Pact hints at the possibility that a new international 
treaty, to complement the Lisbon Treaty, could prove sufficient to address legal hurdles. 
25 
Some proposals, by being more limited in scope and time of fiscal commitments, such as the Eurobills and the 
Redemption Pact, expect to be able to pass this German constitutional test.26 Others are explicit that they 
may have to confront these legal challenges.27
                                                 
23 Article 125 TFEU: “The Union (…) and a Member State shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of central governments, 
regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of another Member State, 
without prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for the joint execution of a sp ecific project.” 
  
24 The creation of the EFSF and the assistance program to Greece were based on  the Article 122 that allows for “financial assistance to 
a Member State is in difficulty or is seriously threatened with severe difficulties caused by natural disasters or exceptional 
occurrences beyond its control”. It was subsequently decided to amend the Lisbon Treaty and in particular Article 136 in such a way 
that it specifically made the recourse to financial assistance between M ember States a clear provision of the Treaty and therefore 
clarified the contours and the application of Article 125.  
25 The German legal constraints are often p ortrayed as categorical but our reading of legal writings suggests a m ore nuanced 
interpretation. And two important rulings frame in more details what the Karlsruhe Constitutional Court deems legally possible. The 
first one is a ruling of the Court in June 2009 on the Lisbon Treaty through which the Court set some important safeguards for further 
political integration considering the degree of democratic legitimacy imposed by the German Constitution. The second important 
ruling is that of September 2011 on the EFSF that sets importantly guidelines with respect to the national budgetary process and the 
necessary involvement of the Bundestag. In essence, the EFSF ruling flags that “permanent” and “automatic” mechanisms that could 
create a cost to the German budget without the approval of the Bundestag would not be compatible with the Basic Law.  
26 For example, the Bundestag to renew guarantees as part of its voting every year on the budget might satisfy the ongoing 
involvement of the parliament sought by the Constitutional Court. 
27There may be other institutional means to introduce commonly issued debt while respecting the Treaty and national constitutions. 
“Enhanced cooperation”, an arrangement made possible by the Lisbon Treaty, allows a smaller group of EU countries—a minimum of 
9—to establish a deeper degree of integration on specific policy areas. This could be used to organize and institutionalize the scope of 
policy integration required. So far, such agreements have been resisted because they were seen as allowing a multi-speed Europe and 
potentially weakening the EU altogether.  
Accountability. Whether legal changes are needed for any common debt issuance is importantly also an issue 
of legitimacy, governance and accountability. Even if not strictly necessary, treaty and constitutional 
changes may be desirable since they would involve a process by which politicians, parliaments, and possibly 
voters are explicitly invited to opine on the new instrument.28 Decisions are also needed on how 
intergovernmental guarantees are secured and renewed. What might be the best and politically acceptable 
procedures, however, is not clear and requires more thought.29 Except for addressing the Treaty and German 
constitutional court challenge, however, most proposals leave these and other, more detailed institutional 
issues to be decided at a later stage.30
5. Possible paths 
 
The various proposals’ success will depend on their ability to help start a process towards a fiscal union, while 
conforming to the current economic challenges and political constraints. Although none of these proposals by 
themselves can alter the political underpinnings, they can, within the current political boundaries, precipitate 
further political change and tighter fiscal integration. In this light, some of the proposals should be regarded 
as complements rather than as substitutes. Indeed, some could be introduced jointly or in sequence to 
maximize their economic benefits and make their introduction politically more acceptable. Among the many 
possible combinations and sequencing alternatives we review two, each leading to similar outcomes, 
including an equivalent fiscal union.  
Path 1: A first path (Figure 1) builds on the recent governance changes and associated commitment to fiscal 
discipline and allows a permanent mechanism to emerge relatively quickly. It starts with the issuance of 
Eurobills and longer-term project bonds backing specific projects. These two initiatives, being small initially, 
allow for learning and reversal should results be unsatisfactory or states weaken commitment to fiscal 
discipline. The other advantage is that it addresses sovereign-bank links right away, although on a small scale 
at first. This path allows moving relatively rapidly towards a broad common debt issuance and a fiscal union, 
yet allows for control over the pace and dynamics of the transition.  
 
                                                 
28 Legitimacy is of course not just limited to these instruments and applies to other issues and areas across EU and Eurozone 
decision-making. Some guidance on what arrangements might be best comes from other federal states (for lessons fr om U.S. and 
others, see H enning and Kessler, 2012, and Bordo, Markiewicz, and Jonung, 2011). See also De Grauwe (2011), Scharpf (1988, 2006, 
and 2011), McKay (1996), and Von Hagen (1993). 
29 For example, if there are (annual) allocations, will there be a specific voting structure, with some countries having an explicit or 
implicit veto power? This has the benefit of safeguarding against some risks (e.g., during the roll-in phase, guarantees could be 
stopped). Or do countries sign on in general, either with an overall cap on guarantees or in some unrestricted way, with the 
guarantees to follow automatically? Some other essential governance questions are: What is the process for deciding whether 
countries have satisfied the various fiscal conditions and disciplines? Is there an appeal process, say through the European Court of 
Justice? Most proposals leave these issues to be d ecided later as well. 
30 The most specific to date, the Blue-Red bond proposal, suggests annual allocations of guarantees to be voted on by resp ective 
parliaments, with an (implicit) veto right of Germany and an appeal process with a role for the EU Court of Justice. The Redemption 
Pact, by design, assumes a one-time approval when debts are mutualized. The Eurobill proposal is less specific, but would obviously 
work best with a one-time, permanent approval. 
Figure 1: From Eurobills and Project Bonds to Eurobonds 
 The biggest risk with this path is of a political nature since, by design, it can be abandoned quickly (e.g., if a 
member state decides not to renew its guarantees). Conversely, it can, if urgency calls for it and political 
support exists, also easily be accelerated and expanded. As a consequence, the timetable is purely indicative. 
Indeed, urgency related to financial distress could dictate a more rapid expansion of Eurobills to cover a larger 
share of debt issuance. Timing can also be adjusted depending on democratic processes that could lead to 
the introduction of an enhanced cooperation agreement as an intermediary step or to a new international 
treaty, both as steps toward a broader revision of the EU Treaty.  
Path 2: The second path (Figure 2) also builds on existing governance changes, but uses as a starting point 
the Redemption Pact to mutualize some debt in order to achieve lower debt-to-GDP ratios. If successfully 
implemented, the debt-to-GDP ratio of states would after 25 years have converged to 60 percent. With debt 
burdens more similar, the Blue-Red bond or other such proposals could be introduced with less political 
tensions and concerns over moral hazard as the current worry that highly indebted countries would require 
permanent subsidies would have lessened. The joint and several guarantees would then present smaller ex-
ante distributional consequences, while the market-disciplining role of marginal borrowing costs would 
presumably be more credible. The more wide-ranging benefits of common debt could still apply and the safer 
mutualized sovereign debt held on banks’ balance-sheets under the Redemption Pact would increase 
financial stability. 
 
• Review experiences, extend maturity/scope 
• Adopt Blue bond / Red bond
•Modify ESM Treaty into European Treasury
•Greater authority of eurogroup on fiscal/banking 
matters
•Greater accountability to European/national 
parliaments
• A pledge to move towards a form of fiscal union after 
six pack, fiscal compact and two pack are implemented
•Legitimize and improve accountability of economic 
governance arrangements
•Council to issue common debt in pilot schemes 
under enhanced cooperation (no Treaty change):
•1- eurobills: to finance national budgets
•2- project bonds: to finance European projects
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Figure 2: From Redemption fund to Eurobonds 
 
Yet this path is not without possible downsides, some arising from the limitations of each proposal 
individually, others from sequencing. In particular, the Redemption Pact assumes the implied consolidation 
paths to be tenable economically and politically. Since the sustainability and debt dynamics for key countries 
that would take part are currently being questioned, this raises some important credibility questions. It 
presumes no major shocks over the period and countries to sustain fiscal adjustments rarely observed over 
such a long period in any advanced economy. In addition, the ability of still high-indebted countries to issue 
national, junior debts following the phase-in (during which their financing requirements are largely met) is 
unclear. If markets start to doubt the credibility of the adjustment paths, appetite for national as well as 
common debt will drop, thereby threatening the Redemption Pact’s feasibility. Finally, the transition from 
Redemption bonds to a form of Blue-Red bonds —and the accompanying strengthening of the fiscal union—
may not happen. Indeed, the political will to introduce a permanent mechanism may be little both if the 
Redemption Pact fails (e.g., because member states deviated from their consolidation path) or if it succeeds 
and debt levels converge to a lower level and the urgency to pool debt recedes, thereby leaving the monetary 
union incomplete and exposed to future instability. 
Other combinations can be envisioned, such as introducing concurrently the Redemption Fund and Eurobills 
(a report for the EU parliament by rapporteur Sylvie Goulard bears many parallels with this path). The 
Redemption fund would deal with the debt and adjustment of high-debt countries, while the Eurobills would 
provide some continuous market access at lower rates, even after the phase-in period of the Redemption 
• A pledge to move towards a form of fiscal union after 
six pack, fiscal compact and two pack are implemented
•Legitimize and improve accountability of economic 
governance arrangements
• European Council launches Redemption Pact 
through a new intergovernmental Treaty
•Discussions of next steps and permanent mechanisms 
provided member states stick to adjustment paths
•Review experiences, extend maturity/scope 
• Adopt Blue bond / Red bond
•Modify ESM Treaty into European Treasury
•Greater authority of eurogroup on fiscal/banking 
matters
•Greater accountability to European/national 
parliaments
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fund ends. This combination presents some benefits over the other two paths, but comes at the cost of larger 
guarantees.  
Overall, several combinations of initiatives can be envisioned that allow for a gradual introduction of common 
debt mechanisms while the necessary legislative and political changes for a tighter budgetary union are put 
in place. Eventually, and depending on experiences and political endorsements, member states could also 
agree to revise the EU Treaty with the view to establish in European primary legislation and national laws the 
institutions for a real budgetary union. In this context, the ESM could, after a period, have its mandate 
amended to evolve towards a European Treasury.  
6. Conclusions 
Common debt could bring reprieve from current financial instability. Specifically, the creation of a large safe 
asset can reduce flight to safety from one sovereign to another and weaken the links between banks and 
their respective sovereigns that are currently destabilizing. Common debt issuance could also be a structural 
stabilizing feature of the euro area by helping to create deeper and more liquid financial markets allowing the 
monetary union to capture the liquidity gains of a broader sovereign debt market. Importantly, these 
initiatives can serve to focus attention on the need for fiscal federalism including macro-economic 
stabilization and risk-sharing mechanisms but also fiscal discipline.  
But there clearly are risks associated with such common instruments. In terms of fiscal discipline, the pricing 
approaches, where countries’ own debt is lower ranked and hence pays a higher price, are intriguing. But the 
tranching creates new challenges, not least if the junior tranches replicate the instability that we are 
currently witnessing. Similarly, to the extent that funds are earmarked to repay the common debt, greater 
pro-cyclicality may ensue as earmarked resources are less available to deal with adverse shocks.  
Ideally then, common debt should follow from a fundamental discussion of the long-term shape of a fiscal, 
financial and monetary union. The absence of a debate on fiscal union reflects in part historical concerns that 
one group of countries may become dependent on another group on a permanent basis. But short of 
addressing these fundamental issues completely, common debt issuance can initiate a political process 
towards this goal. If, for the moment, there is only appetite for limited and bounded fiscal risk-sharing, then 
the Eurobills can start a learning process. These could be scaled up if proven successful and evolve towards 
more ambitious structures. If the assessment is that a key task today is to bring debt-to-GDP ratios down 
before further progress can be made, then the Redemption Pact is the right first step. But this would take 20-
25 years and delay the creation of a permanent mechanism to complete the monetary union.    
Thus, addressing both the current debt overhang problem and insuring against loss of market access likely 
requires combining several proposals. And while a gradual phase-in provides some advantages, in particular 
as it can foster a political discussion about fiscal risk-sharing and transfers, the current financial crisis might 
call for more rapid introduction. Regardless, steps towards common debt issuance require an open political 
discussion given the importance of accountability and legitimacy dimensions associated with the embryonic 
creation of a fiscal union. Federations are not static political constructs and common debt issuance can both 
contribute to effective economic management and act as a catalyst for political change. In that sense, the 
proposals put forward are a constructive feature of the ongoing discussion, forcing a critical and focused 
rethinking of the EMU architecture. 
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Annex I: Details on proposals 
1. Euro-Bills, by Christian Hellwig (Toulouse) and Thomas Philippon (NYU)  
The key idea of this proposal is to help loosen the sovereign-banks’ link. It is also a learning step towards 
more ambitious proposals for euro-bonds. In that sense, it sets up the structure to minimize the risks, 
especially moral hazard, and keep the costs low. The motivation, in addition to starting at a manageably 
small level, is to potentially bypass treaty and German constitutional court constraints. 
Key features, benefits and risks: 
Issuance of euro-bills (short-maturity euro securities) that are the joint and several obligations of all euro-
zone (EZ) members. The bills would be issued by a euro area Debt Management Office (DMO). All EZ members 
would participate and the DMO would be the only issuer of short-term bills on behalf of the members. 
Treasuries of the members would submit demand schedules for issuances on the basis of which the DMO 
would, using auctions and other methods, issue euro-bills to cover all the needs. If there is any unbid amount, 
ECB would buy (like the German Bundesbank who buys as an agent any unsold Bund issuance, and then 
resells on the secondary market). The proposal is consistent with the long-term goals of EZ fiscal and 
financial integration.  
Bank asset. As a safe asset, Euro-bills would be treated for regulatory and accounting purposes at banks and 
other financial institutions like the highest rated sovereign claim now (e.g., Bunds). They would receive zero 
weight for capital adequacy purposes, similar accounting treatment (book-value reporting, no mark-to-
market), and also be the only level 1 sovereign claim accepted for liquidity purposes (e.g., to meet any 
liquidity ratio under BIII).  
All countries would need to be included initially (except those under programs). Bank-sovereign links would 
be broken as euro-bills have less and pooled sovereign risk.  
Fiscal discipline. In return for the joint and several liability, conditionality on fiscal discipline would be 
required. It would be enforced through a pricing mechanism rather than through quantitative targets. Instead 
of shutting countries out, participants may be asked to pay a penalty interest rate if they do not meet criteria 
of fiscal responsibility. 
Limits on joint and several liability. Strong countries would provide the bulk of the initial guarantee. Weak 
countries could be asked to pay a small premium over the Euro-bills rate, perhaps related to their fiscal and 
debt situation. This premium could go into a fund for insurance or be used to (temporarily) offset the higher 
costs for others. 
Risk management 
To prevent excessive issuance, there would be a cap, e.g., total euro-bills could not exceed 10% of country 
GDP, similar to ratio of stock of T-bills in the US. In the short run, there may also need to be a cap on short-term 
borrowing outside euro-bills (with some flexibility for cash management). The rest of a country’s needs would 
have to be met independently through longer-dated bonds, which will be subject to the market test. Rates on 
long-term bonds would provide valuable price signals for the DMO.  
Because the bills expire in a short period and the amount is capped, contingent liability to the main guarantor 
countries is relatively well defined and limited. Thus objections of the German constitutional court may be 
overcome. (The court argued that the German authorities cannot take on an obligation that is open-ended, 
unpredictable, and subject to the decisions of other sovereigns. While the euro-bill does not overcome the risk 
that other sovereigns may misbehave and hence create a cost for the German taxpayer, the risk is minimized 
and capped.)  
Short-run sovereign crisis management 
 At 10% of GDP, Euro-bills could cover about half of the funding needs of Spain and Italy in 2012.  
• Costs. Euro-bills might raise borrowing costs for some, but this need not be (much) for two reasons. 
One, in general, and clearly for the US T-bills, there is a liquidity premium for short-term, very liquid, near cash 
instruments. This premium now accrues, to some degree, to German bills, but is still less than that for US T-
bills since the volume is smaller, and does not accrue to other EZs since volumes are even smaller (and for 
some the credit risk is currently high). Two, if euro-bills improve overall fiscal policy, debt management of 
weaker EZs, they may reduce the implicit fiscal liability (and other economic costs) that stronger countries 
now incur, thus reducing their borrowing costs. 
• Moral hazard is minimized by: (a) capping the amount of issuance, (b) allowing for a price-based 
incentive mechanism, and (c) creating an explicit guarantee instead of the current implicit and open-ended 
guarantees. 
• Oversight. In the long run, procedures should be designed to allow parliamentary oversight while 
ensuring stability of Euro-bills. Parliamentary oversight is a democratic requirement for all countries, and a 
constitutional one for some (e.g., Germany). 
• Exit. If a country is dissatisfied, it could exit, but hurdles would be high. Exit procedures must be 
transparent, predictable, and costly. As long as the DMO (or other institution) enforces the rules, countries 
will choose to stay in. But the possibility of exit will give incentives to the DMO to perform its monitoring and 
enforce the rules. 
• Institutional infrastructure. Design of the issuance process and institutional infrastructure could 
build on existing best practice DMOs in the EU (nevertheless, many issues would need to be explored further, 
related to the choice of market-markers, institutional infrastructure, e.g., payments system, etc.) 
Designating market-makers with specific obligations can help limit short-run liquidity issues, especially to 
ensure a smooth functioning of the secondary market. For primary market, where currently, some national 
central banks fulfill this role, the ECB would have to take this on. There is probably the need to develop, in 
parallel, derivatives markets. To the extent that this is OTC—through repos, swaps etc.—this will happen 
organically and quickly. Possibly, however, more formal exchange-based instruments need to be introduced 
in parallel. 
  
2. Blue-Red Bonds, by Jacques Delpla and Jakob von Weizsäcker (2.0) 
The key idea of this proposal is to create a Euro-wide “blue” bond but one that is restricted to the sum of 60 
percent of each member’s GDP. This safe bond would insulate banks from sovereign risks and potentially 
lower borrowing costs for sovereigns. Also, any residual borrowing by a sovereign would occur through a “red” 
bond” on its own account and hence at a cost that reflected its creditworthiness. This is an ambitious 
proposal (short of euro-bonds only) and as such has many institutional/financial markets requirements to 
minimize the risks, especially moral hazard, and keep the costs low. Moreover, in view of the fiscal risk 
transfer implied in the proposal, it faces the biggest hurdles in implementation. 
Key features, benefits and risks 
Euro-area countries would divide their sovereign debt into two parts. The first part, up to 60 percent of each 
country’s GDP, should be pooled as 'Blue' bonds with senior status, to be jointly and severally guaranteed by 
participating countries. All debt beyond that should be issued as purely national 'Red' bonds with junior 
status.  
•  Blue debt is senior, repaid before any other public debt—except the IMF which enjoys super 
seniority—and issued only up to 60 percent of GDP, below the debt-carrying capacity of any developed EU 
member state, even under extreme stress. On top, Blue debt is jointly and severally guaranteed. It thus will 
likely enjoy super-safe AAA. 
• Costs. These bonds would be the lion's share of sovereign borrowing in the euro area. It would make 
debt more affordable by creating an asset on par with the US Treasury bond that satisfies the demand for safe 
and liquid investment opportunities, including from central banks and other large investors. Conservative 
guesstimate of liquidity gains are that countries could save up to 0.30 percent each year, or perhaps as much 
as a 10 percent reduction in the net present value of debt servicing costs. 
Governance mechanism 
The annual allocation of Blue Bonds would be proposed by an independent stability council staffed by 
independent professionals (like board of ECB). This allocation would approved by national parliaments of 
participating countries, having the ultimate budgetary authority required to issue the Blue Bond mutual 
guarantees. Any country voting against would thereby decide neither to issue any Blue Bonds in the coming 
year nor to guarantee any Blue Bonds of that particular vintage. Since exit of any major participating country 
could undermine confidence in the entire scheme, the independent stability council would have incentives to 
err on the side of caution, thereby safeguarding the interests of the European taxpayer.  
•  Moral hazard. First, institutional control: the independent stability council allocates Blue Bonds 
according to principles of the SGP and notions of general fiscal sustainability, exemplified by national fiscal 
rules. Second, borrowing costs for Red Bonds would be high for countries in breach of the SGP, thereby 
imposing market discipline.  
• Entry. Full participation is not an entitlement but to be earned through enhanced fiscal credibility, by 
means of low debt levels or credible institutional guarantees (credible national fiscal rules in particular) that 
put public finances on a sustainable path.  
• Blue debt agency. For Blue Bonds to be the operational equivalent of plain national sovereign debt, a 
joint debt agency will be created to which tax revenues would be transferred directly to avoid the holding 
discount customary for multilateral debt.  
Red Bonds: These would help to enforce fiscal discipline. Red Bonds would make borrowing more expensive at 
the margin, especially for countries pursuing unsustainable fiscal policies or lacking fiscal credibility, thereby 
reinforcing the rules-based Stability and Growth Pact through market signals.  
• Juniority: Red debt, as the junior tranche, could and would be honored only after the entire Blue debt 
has been fully serviced. Red Bonds could form the basis for an orderly default mechanism (and would allow 
for a smaller ESM). 
• National responsibility: Red debt would be issued by national Treasuries. Red debt can never be 
guaranteed by another country or be bailed out by any EU mechanisms (EFSM, EFSF, or ESM). The ‘no bail-out’ 
would apply only and strictly to the Red debt.  
• Not in banking system: To allow for an orderly default, Red debt should largely be kept out of the 
banking system through two measures. First, only Blue, not Red debt is eligible for ECB refinancing operations 
(to avoid disruptions, this could be implemented gradually as Red Bonds are introduced). Second, regulators 
need to assure that holdings of Red Bonds are backed up by higher capital requirements. 
Introduction of Blue-Red Bonds. Could either occur gradually, with Blue and Red Bonds replacing legacy debt 
as it is rolled over, or in a big bang in exchange for the entirely legacy debt stock. Gradual is more attractive to 
gain credibility and political support, as well as to avoid large valuation effects. A big bang would, however, 
create a deeply liquid pool of Blue debt would be created overnight and could potentially be used for a 
comprehensive debt restructuring if views on debt sustainability suggest this necessity. 
  
3. Stability Bonds, by European Commission31
The key ideas of this discussion paper is to review means by which governments can finance by offering safe 
and liquid investment opportunities for savers and financial institutions and provide options for setting up a 
euro-area wide integrated bond market that matches its US Dollar counterpart in terms of size and liquidity. 
Three options are tabled with varying order of ambition. Depending on the option chosen, many 
institutional/financial markets changes are required to minimize the risks, especially moral hazard, and keep 
the costs low. Options would need to be accompanied by varying degrees of closer and stricter fiscal 
surveillance to ensure budgetary discipline. Some options might require a Treaty change.  
 
Key features, benefits and risks 
There are really three options tabled, in order of ambition: 1. The full substitution by Stability Bond issuance of 
national issuance, with joint and several guarantees—full Eurobonds; 2. The partial substitution by Stability 
Bond issuance of national issuance, with joint and several guarantees—akin to Blue-Red Bonds; and 3. The 
partial substitution by Stability Bond issuance of national issuance, with several but not joint guarantees 
(i.e., liable for a share based on some key)—akin to an EFSF structure. As such, the proposal encompasses a 
wide spectrum, with corresponding varying demands for (changes) to institutional environments to address 
moral hazard risks. 
Option 1: “Eurobonds” 
•  Joint and several. All participants will be jointly liable for debt, thus lowering refinancing cost for 
some, with the strongest distributional impact between participating members and the highest degree of 
fiscal risk-sharing. 
• Issuance, debt-servicing. Most efficient if centralized, but could still be decentralized. 
• Financing. Participating countries could refinance themselves irrespective of national public finance 
conditions, thereby helping some deal with current funding pressures. 
•  Amounts, liquidity premium. Amounts would be large and there would be scope for liquidity premium 
gains and enhanced monetary policy transmission. 
• Stability. Sovereign-banking systems links would be broken, with associated gains. 
 
• Conditions. To balance the open-ended risks of full Eurobonds—creating high incentives for moral 
hazard—strict conditions would need to apply, going beyond current regulations, including on budget 
adjustment and structural reforms. 
                                                 
31 European Commission (2011). 
•  Treaty. It would need changes/amendments to the Treaty and take considerable time. 
Option 2: “Blue-Red Bonds” 
•  Joint and several. All participants will again be jointly liable for the Stability Bonds, but up to a limit 
and not for any remaining national debts. 
•  Limits. The Stability Bonds would be limited in volume to up to a predefined level (60% of GDP or 
variable linked to compliance with rules and recommendations of governance framework) and be senior 
(“Blue bonds”). Remaining debt would have to be financed with junior debt (“Red Bonds”). 
•  Costs. Senior debt would face somewhat lower refinancing cost for some countries, with some 
distributional impact between participating members and fiscal risk-sharing. 
• Issuance, debt-servicing. Most efficient for senior debt if centralized, but could also be still 
decentralized.  
• Financing. Depending on exact phasing-in schedule, participating countries could refinance 
themselves in the buildup phase more liberally, less respective of national public finance conditions, thereby 
helping some with current funding pressures. 
• Amounts, liquidity premium. Amounts would be relatively large and there is scope for liquidity 
premium gains. 
• Stability. Sovereign-national banking system links would be broken to some degree, with associated 
gains. 
• Conditions. To balance the risks, particularly during the start-up phase, with incentives for moral 
hazard, conditions would need to apply, going beyond current regulations, including on budget adjustment 
and structural reforms. 
• Treaty. This option would likely require changes to/amendment of the Treaty. 
Option 3: “EFSF Bonds” 
•  Several. Participants will only be liable for Stability Bonds up to a predetermined share/amount. 
•  Limits. The amounts would be limited and determined as guarantees are forthcoming. 
 •  Costs. Debt would face the same or somewhat lower refinancing cost for some countries, with some 
distributional impact. 
•  Issuance. Debt-servicing. Would likely still decentralized.  
•  Financing. Depending on phasing-in schedule, countries could refinance themselves in the buildup 
phase more liberally, less respective of national public finance conditions, thereby helping some countries 
deal with current funding pressures. 
•  Amounts. liquidity premium. Amounts would be limited, with less scope for liquidity premium gains. 
•  Stability. Sovereign-national banking system links would not be broken. 
•  Conditions. For moral hazard, conditions would still need to apply. 
•  Treaty. This option would likely require no changes to/amendment of the Treaty. 
  
4. European Debt Redemption Pact, by German Council of Economic Experts32
The key idea is to separate the debt that has been accumulated to date by individual countries into a part 
that is compatible with the 60% debt threshold of the SGP, and a part exceeding this threshold. States’ debt 
exceeding the 60 % ceiling on a certain date would be transferred into the European Debt Redemption Fund 
(ERF) for which all members would be jointly and severally liable. In return, countries would enter into 
payment obligations toward the ERF so as to repay the transferred debts within some 25 years. During a roll-
in phase stretching over a couple of years, participating countries shall be able to refinance themselves up to 
an amount. The authors suggest that the design overcomes European legal barriers to implementation. 
 
Key features, benefits and risks 
•  Eligibility: Participation is open to all Euro-countries. At the very least, states with debt above 60 % of 
GDP (at 2011, Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Germany, France, Italy, Malta, the Netherlands, and Spain) should 
take part. Countries with adjustment programs can join immediately, but their debts can only be transferred 
after their program ends. 
•  Joint and several. While each country will have to service its own debt, participants will be jointly 
liable for the debt, thus lowering refinancing cost for some. 
•  Financing: During a roll-in phase, participating countries can refinance themselves up to the amount 
their current debt exceeds 60% of GDP. This amounts to about EUR 2.3 trillion, of which Italy (958 billion), 
Germany (580 billion), France (498 billion), Belgium (136 billion) and Spain (88 billion), Austria (41 billion), 
the Netherlands (24 billion), Malta (0.5 billion) and Cyprus (0.4 billion). Actual refinancing depends, besides 
on current debt level ratios, on debt term structure. French, Italian and Belgian financing requirements will be 
covered for 3 to 5 years. Germany, Spain, the Netherlands and Austria would partly finance under their own 
national responsibility already. 
•  Conditions. To take advantage of lower costs for the transferred debt, strict conditions apply, 
including: earmarking/devoting a part of the tax revenue for fulfilling the payment obligations; depositing 
collaterals, and obligation to commit to consolidation and structural reforms. Remaining national debt must 
after ERF not again exceed 60 % of GDP. To this end, debt brakes need to be introduced in all participating 
countries (based on the German and Swiss models). In particular, following a transition period, the structural 
deficit should not exceed a value of 0.5 % of GDP. 
•  Costs. Market liquidity for ERF bonds would presumably be high as amounts are large. Proposers 
estimate that interest rate to be between 2.5% and 4%. 
                                                 
32 See Bofinger et al (2011). 
•  Limits. Unlike Eurobonds, the debt assumed by the ERF is from the outset limited both in time and in 
volume. With each redemption payment to the ERF, the volume of bonds guaranteed jointly and severally 
decreases, meaning that the fund slowly abolishes itself. Nation states are themselves responsible for 
financing their current deficits through the market after completion of the roll-in phase.  
•  Timing. As the roll-in into the ERF is stretched over a range of several years, changes at the 
constitutional level could take some time—but would require commitment now. 
•  Exit. If a country failed to honor commitments during the roll-in phase, the roll-in would be stopped. 
When a participant failed to honor its commitments at any time, the participant would forfeit the collateral 
deposited with the new Fund (20% deposit in the form of international reserves, gold and foreign exchange), 
and earmark/devoted tax revenues would be used for fulfilling the payment obligations.  
Additionally, to prevent the ERF to finally degenerate into unconditional Eurobonds the highest constitutional 
safeguards will have to be put in place in each country. In the case of Germany this would mean to link any 
prolongation or perpetuation of the ERF to Article 146 of the German Basic Law which eventually means that a 
referendum is necessary about a new constitution. 
  
5. European Safe Bonds (ESBies), by Euro-nomics,  a group of European Academics.33
The European Safe Bond (ESBies) would be the senior tranche of a portfolio of European bonds. Such a bond 
would serve two purposes. First, because it will be very safe, banks that hold ESBies would limit their exposure 
to sovereign risks. Second, where there is a flight to safety, it would be from the junior (risky) bond to the 
ESBies and not, as now, from one country to another—such flights being a source of multiple equilibriums and 
instability. Because the core proposal requires no sovereign guarantees, it faces no legal hurdle to 
implementation, and can be reversed. Its intent is to use public initiative to solve a coordination problem such 
that the established products are eventually taken over by the private sector. 
 
Key features, benefits and risks 
In its essence, a new European Debt Agency (EDA) would buy existing sovereign bonds of the 17 euro nations, 
up to 60 percent of each country’s GDP. The EDA would issue and sell on the private market two securities 
backed by these assets: European Safe Bonds (ESBies) and European Junior Bonds (EJBs). Credit 
enhancement (capital guarantee) could be added.  
•  Pool secondary market bonds. EDA would (in steady state) buy sovereign bonds in secondary 
markets only, in proportion to each country’s GDP of all countries, not just the troubled countries. While 
ESBies scheme is phased-in, countries would have on average some three years of funding covered, which 
provides breathing room for countries in stressed situations to make the necessary structural adjustments 
and ride out the business cycle.  
• Creating a safe asset. ESBies would be extremely safe, since they are senior claims on diversified 
portfolio of sovereign bonds (with a possible capital guarantee). ESBies would not take any losses unless all 
the EJBs (and capital guarantee) were wiped out. Authors estimate that thirty percent EJBs and seventy 
percent ESBies would make ESBies safe in all but 0.8% of 5-year periods.  
 
• Delinking the sovereign and banks. ESBies is large and would share risks among all euro area 
countries, thus breaking bank-own sovereign links. Regulatory requirements and ECB collateral policy would 
be adjusted to make them the preferred asset for banks to hold for liquidity purposes and refinancing 
operations. This would further break the link between banks and sovereigns.  
 
• Liquidity and flight to safety premium. ESBies would pool 5.5 trillion euros in sovereign bonds. It 
could trade at a premium because they would be large and liquid, appreciate at times of crisis, and satisfy a 
                                                 
33 Proposed by the euro-nomics group, consisting of Markus Brunnermeier, Luis Garicano, Philip R. Lane, Marco Pagano, Ricardo Reis, 
Tano Santos, Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh and Dimitri Vayanos, 26 September, 2011. 
large, global demand for safe assets. This could lower funding costs, authors estimate by up to 70 basis 
points. 
 
• No joint liability. In their purest form, ESBies and EJBs would carry no government guarantees and 
require no fiscal union. They would require little to no change to current Treaties. In this regard, ESBies can, in 
principle, be implemented at a rapid pace, help dealing with the crisis, and create an institutional structure of 
longer-term value. While large, it would still be a “low-risk” option in that can be reversed.  
 
• Redirecting the flight to safety to prevent multiple equilibriums. Currently, changes in risk 
perceptions lead to large capital flows between countries, which creates self-fulfilling outcomes and raise 
financial stability concerns. With ESBies and EJBs, the flight to safety would occur between these two assets 
without geographic disruptions.  
 
• While maintaining market signals, across complete term structure. ESBies and the junior tranche do 
not eliminate price signals regarding countries possible insolvency, thus continue to provide market 
discipline. Since original debt structures are preserved, ESBies provides a complete reference terms 
structure. 
 
• Transition Phase. To help overcome funding crises of some specific European sovereigns, EDA could 
buy in the primary market and be, in the worst case, the only participant. For example, in a transition period, 
the EDA could buy in the extreme case up to 940 billion euro worth of newly-issued Italian bonds, the 
country's financing needs for the next three years. EDA would purchase these bonds at—or close to—
secondary market prices. As expectations are realigned with fundamentals, yields on all European bonds, but 
especially those in the problem countries, would come down.  
 
• Current program countries. There are good reasons to exclude these countries initially. Some 
countries have currently guaranteed financing at low rates low. It is therefore in their interest to borrow from 
the IMF/EFSF/EU rather than to place their bonds with the EDA. Also, since there is no liquid market for their 
debt, it would be difficult to establish the right market price for the EDA purchases. And if these countries 
restructured their debt, as in case of Greece, the EJB would start off delivering ex post low returns which 
would hinder the EDA’s ability to sell them and establish a reputation. Countries could though gain admission 
to the EDA upon exiting their programs, providing another incentive to repay their debts and undertake 
necessary structural reforms. 
 
• Who will buy EJBs. Authors estimate that at sovereign, 10-year maturity bond rates of late last year, 
EJBs would earn a yield-to-maturity of 9.8% per annum, high in the current environment, attractive to say 
sovereign wealth funds. A second attraction of these securities for some investors may be that they have 
“fixed embedded leverage.” And, in the same way that households hold a large fraction of sovereign bonds 
today, the authors expect there to be substantial demand for EJBs from the household sector.  
 
• Market-maker for EJB. In the short-run, to further create liquidity for EJBs, a market maker may be 
needed. This may initially need to be a public institution to help overcome the initial coordination failure. As 
markets learn about the new product and institutional arrangements supporting ESBies and EJBs, the 
designated market maker could make substantial trading profits from its liquidity provision, which would 
bolster its market-making role down the line.  
  
ANNEX 2: MONETARY POLICY, FINANCIAL MARKETS FUNCTIONING 
There are many others monetary policy and financial market questions to be analyzed. Annex Table 1 
summarizes the proposals along some of these dimensions: 
Annex Table 1: Monetary Policy and Financial Markets 
 
Monetary policy and ECB collateral. As regards to the specific objective of improving monetary policy 
transmission, the Eurobills may have the most obvious direct benefits to offer since short-term sovereign 
instruments tend to be used most for monetary policy purposes and are important pricing benchmarks by 
banks and other financial institutions for lending. More generally though, by providing a single safe assets, all 
instruments offer potential gains in terms of improving financial markets’ functioning and some can also 
assist in exiting from unconventional monetary policy and liquidity operations (such as LTRO). Another 
question is whether the new instruments will be (solely) eligible as collateral (with no or minimal haircuts) 
for the ECB and national central banks. Most proposals clearly say so for the senior claims, but few say 
explicitly that the junior tranches are not eligible as collateral (the Red bond is not acceptable as collateral; 
some proposals also suggest that remaining national sovereign claims rated less than AAA could only be 
accepted with haircuts). 
Secondary market prices and arbitrage. All proposals will have implications for the secondary market prices of 
existing, national debts, but net effects are not clear. If the scheme enhances overall debt sustainability (by 
lowering borrowing costs or enhancing fiscal discipline), prices of all (classes of) debts can increase. There 
will also be arbitrage between primary and secondary market prices and between claims with different 
seniority or guaranteed status (e.g., between a joint and several guaranteed short-term claim issued in the 
primary market and an existing sovereign, unguaranteed long-term claim with a short residual maturity). But 
  Euro-bills Blue-Red Bonds  Stability Bonds Redemption Pact ESBies 
Monetary policy 
transmission 
mechanism 
Most direct Over time through 
single instrument 
Depending on 
option 
More limited, 
temporary 
Possibly through 
single instrument 
Price effects Limited/none New seniority classes could mean large changes if phased in 
fast and an issue at transition points 
 
Limited. 
Maintains price 
signals across 
yield curves 
Scope for 
“arbitrage” 
Limited, except for 
“kink” at 1 yr 
Possibly, among various classes and through collateral Scope for some 
among classes 
Institutional 
infrastructure  
A central Debt 
Management 
Office allocates 
Joint debt agency. 
National govts still 
issue Red debt 
Depending on 
option, could 
have a central 
debt office 
European 
Redemption Fund 
(central debt 
office) 
A new European 
Debt Agency 
 
if the seniority structures are meaningful, one should not expect full arbitrage between different seniority 
classes and prices of existing debts that become junior to the new (common) instruments can decline.34
There are also some risks. If valuation losses for existing debt holders like banks are large, this may be 
destabilizing. Also arbitrage and profits-seeking trading strategies may have unexpected and undesirable 
consequences, especially in transition, when there will be multiple types of claims with varying obligors, 
guarantees, and seniority status. The possibility of “dual markets” can not only lead to fragmentation and 
reduced liquidity, but may also create unpleasant dynamics. For example, the interplay among the various 
instruments of all sovereigns involved, including through the CDS market, can be destabilizing (e.g., a 
downgrade of one sovereign will affect those sovereigns which guarantee (in part) the debt of that sovereign, 
which can trigger adverse feedback/negative spirals).
  
35
Market making. Another question, though likely more of secondary importance, is whether there is a need for 
a market-making role by the public sector, either in the short-run or more permanently, or whether private 
financial markets alone can take this on. Arguably, the novelty of some of the instruments would call for some 
public backup, if just to assure liquidity. This is probably the least necessary for the Eurobills, but the ESBies 
proposal sees a role for the EFSF/ESM to backup the EJBs. Related are questions, albeit mostly also of 
secondary importance, on the need for (new) payments and clearing systems, formal secondary market 
trading mechanisms, and derivatives markets for the new instruments. 
 Some of these risks are probably the least with the 
Eurobills, since it has a simple structure, but much will depend, besides on the speed of phase-in and 
comprehensiveness of the schemes, on the investor bases holding various claims.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
34 In the context of the Eurobills, for example, there could be a “kink” in the yield curve, i.e., a discontinuity in the term structure of 
interest rates, and a difference between it and other unguaranteed long-term claim with a residual maturity less than 1 year. This 
could adverse affect pricing of risk along the term structure and create negative incentives for the borrower (purposeful shortening 
the maturity). 
35 In the context of the financial crisis, tranching structures of mortgages and other securitized assets have led to runs on a mor e 
junior instrument triggering adverse price dynamics in other, more senior tranches ones, with adverse feedback loops. Arguably, this 
was a case where the probabilities of default on the underlying assets were considered to be low, but where the loss given default 
turned out to be large, in part as in the adverse states of the world, risks turned out to be closely correlated. Whether there are these 
parallels here to the sovereign case is not clear, but there may be lessons from the pricing of EFSF bonds, which also have guarantees. 
